This paper examines leader-follower games where a leader must purchase an essential input from a price-setting supplier in order to take an action. We show that equilibrium outcomes when the followers perfectly observe the leaders'actions cannot be approximated by mixed equilibrium outcomes of the game where followers imperfectly observe the leaders'actions, i.e. they are not accessible. Accessibility fails since in a pure strategy equilibrium, a supplier makes positive pro…ts; however in an equilibrium where a leader randomizes, supplier pro…ts must be zero. Our result follows from a generalized indi¤erence principle that mixed strategies must satisfy in economic environments. While supplier pro…ts cannot be approximated, player action pro…les are accessible. Our results also apply to games with costly observation.
The noisy observation game will, in general, have multiple equilibria; van Damme and Hurkens use equilibrium selection theory to argue that the mixed equilibrium supporting the Stackelberg outcome is more likely to be played than any other equilibrium. On the other hand, Oechssler and Schlag (2000) use evolutionary dynamics, which typically favor pure strategy equilibria, to select the pure strategy non-Stackelberg equilibrium. Huck and Müller (2000) present experimental evidence showing that the outcome is close to Stackelberg when the noise is small. This result has been substantially generalized by Güth et al. (1998) , who consider …nite leader-follower games with arbitrary numbers of leaders and followers. If payo¤s are generic, they show that there always exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with perfect observation that is accessible. 2 Their proof relies on fundamental properties of generic extensive form games -the existence of a strategically stable set and an essential component. This suggests that accessible outcomes are likely to exist in a large class of games. In particular, if we have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, this will generically be accessible. This o¤ers an intellectual justi…cation for the fact that applied theory continues to analyze models of commitment without reference to Bagwell's claims.
This paper argues that in games played in a natural economic environment, accessibility fails. We examine leader-follower games that are played in a private contracting environment, where the payo¤s to the leaders are in ‡uenced by the prices that they must pay for necessary inputs, and where the suppliers of these inputs have some monopoly power. 3 Our main …nding is that an accessible outcome fails to exist under very general conditions. The failure of accessibility arises since mixed strategy equilibria in these economic environments have to satisfy a generalized indi¤erence principle. The player randomizing between two actions must be indi¤erent between these actions, as is usual. Furthermore, a supplier who quotes a price to him must also be indi¤erent between the player's actions, since he can break the player's indi¤erence by a small reduction in price. This implies that such a supplier 2 Not all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are accessible, even with generic payo¤s -see the example in Güth et al. A similar result is obtained in …nitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring -Bhaskar and van Damme (2002) show that e¢ cient equilibrium outcomes under perfect monitoring may not be accessible with imperfect private monitoring. 3 Since prices can be chosen from a continuum, the results of Güth et al. do not apply in our context. See the discussion in section 5.2.1.
must be making zero pro…ts in a mixed strategy equilibrium. On the other hand, a supplier who is making a sale at a pure strategy pro…le will generally make positive pro…ts. This di¤erence in supplier pro…ts between the noisy game and the noiseless game is the reason for the failure of accessibility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out a simple example that illustrates our basic arguments. Section 3 sets out our general model of a leader-follower game in a contracting environment, when there is perfect observation of the leaders' actions. Section 4 has our main results, when there is noisy observation. Section 5 discusses extensions and the underlying reasons for our results. It shows that our arguments extend to a model of costly but perfect observation. While sections 3 and 4 set out the formal analysis, the discussion in sections 2 and 5 is relatively informal. For the sake of smooth exposition, all proofs are in the appendix.
An entry deterrence example
To illustrate Bagwell's argument, consider the entry-deterrence game in Fig.   1 . The leader is the incumbent …rm, and must choose between I and N;
i.e. whether or not to invest. The entrant observes this decision and decides whether to stay out or enter. Investment requires the purchase of equipment -assume …rst that this is available from a competitive market at price p which equals the cost c: Assume that v c > 0; so that the backward induction outcome has the incumbent choosing I while the entrant stays out. Assume also that v c < u; so that the incumbent invests only in order to deter entry. Now suppose that investment is imperfectly observed. Speci…cally, the follower observes signals from the set fi; ng; where the signal is correct (i.e.
i after I or n after N ) with probability 1 "; and incorrect with probability ". For any " > 0; there cannot be a pure strategy equilibrium where the If the incumbent invests with probability one, then the follower must believe that I has been chosen when he sees signal n; and will therefore stay out. But then it is optimal for the leader not to invest, since v c < u. The only pure strategy equilibrium is where the incumbent does not invest, and the entrant enters irrespective of his signal.
However, if " is small, the noisy game has a mixed strategy equilibrium where the incumbent invests with probability ; where is such that the entrant assigns probability 0:5 to investment having taken place when he sees the signal n: The entrant stays out if he observes the signal i; if he observes n; he enters with probability . The incumbent's payo¤ from investing is
His payo¤ from not investing is
Equating these payo¤s yields = u (v p) (1 ")u "v 2 (0; 1); since u > v c and
; so that the probability of investment converges to 1 as " ! 0. Since the entrant stays out whenever he observes i; the outcome (I;OUT) occurs with a probability that tends to one as " ! 0. Thus the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is accessible.
We now modify the example as follows. Assume that in order to invest, the incumbent must purchase the required equipment from a monopoly supplier, whose cost of production is c. The game with perfect observation, C , is as follows. The supplier quotes a price, p; to the incumbent (this implies that the payo¤s in is played with probability one -we call this the Stackelberg outcome. The action pro…le played in this equilibrium is the same as when the investment good is purchased on a competitive market at price c. However, the supplier earns pro…ts that equal v c; his marginal contribution to the incumbent's payo¤ at this equilibrium. Now let us assume that the investment decision is imperfectly observed.
We claim that there is no equilibrium with an outcome that is close to the Stackelberg outcome. Assume that there is an equilibrium where the incumbent invests with high probability, and where the supplier chooses a price p > c: As in the original Bagwell argument, the incumbent cannot invest with probability one, since the entrant would not vary his behavior with the signal. Let the probability of investment be ; so that the supplier's payo¤ is (p c): We now show that < 1 implies that p cannot be optimal for the supplier. Note that the incumbent must be indi¤erent between investing and not investing at a price of p: If the supplier reduces his price, then the incumbent will strictly prefer to invest -this follows from the fact that the price reduction is unobserved by the entrant and cannot a¤ect his behavior. The supplier can therefore earn (p 0 c) for any p 0 < p; and this exceeds (p c) if p 0 is su¢ ciently close to p. Hence there cannot exist an equilibrium where the incumbent randomizes and where the supplier chooses a price strictly greater than c. 4 Since supplier pro…ts equal v c in the Stackelberg outcome with perfect observability, this outcome is not accessible, since it cannot be approximated in the game with imperfect observation. 5 This argument only requires that the supplier has some monopoly power and makes positive profits in the perfect observation game -one can allow for an alternative supplier of equipment, who has a cost greater than c; and the argument would still apply.
The failure of accessibility applies to supplier payo¤s, not player actions in the entry deterrence game. To see this, we construct an equilibrium in the noisy game, where the supplier quotes p = c; and the incumbent randomizes, choosing I with probability . The entrant's probability of entry on observing n; equates the payo¤s in (1)- (2), with p = c. If the supplier deviates and chooses p > c; the incumbent chooses N for sure. In this equilibrium the incumbent's payo¤ is approximately v c when the noise is small, which is 4 There cannot be an equilibrium where the supplier makes positive pro…ts and randomizes across prices either. Suppose that he chooses p; p 0 with positive probability, where
At p the incumbent must invest with positive probability, since otherwise the supplier's payo¤ is zero. The argument in the text implies that at any p 00 < p; the incumbent must invest with probability one. Thus any p 00 such that p > p 00 > p 0 must give the supplier strictly higher pro…ts than p 0 . 5 An equilibrium outcome (i.e. expected supplier pro…ts and a probability distribution over player action pro…les) is an element of Euclidean space. If we let " ! 0; there does not exist a sequence of equilibria of the associated games C ("), the outcomes of which converge to the Stackelberg outcome in the Euclidean metric.
strictly greater than his payo¤ under perfect observability, 0. In other words, if the incumbent retains his commitment power under imperfect observation, he also enhances his power vis-a-vis his supplier, and captures all the surplus.
Thus the failure of accessibility applies to outcomes, where an outcome is the pair consisting of player action pro…les and supplier payo¤s.
The inability to use mixed strategies implies that we have a failure of accessibility of outcomes in a larger class of games, even in those where the leader has no incentive to deviate from his subgame perfect equilibrium action in the underlying game. Let us return to our entry deterrence example of Fig. 1, but now assume that v c > u. In the base game ; where the investment good is provided at cost, the leader has no incentive to deviate, since I is a best response to OUT. This modi…cation does not a¤ect the analysis of the contracting game with perfect observation, C . If the incumbent does not invest, the entrant will enter and the incumbent's payo¤ will be zero.
The supplier will therefore be able to extract the payo¤ di¤erence, so that p = v 0. Now consider the game where the leader's action is observed with noise. In any equilibrium where the incumbent invests for sure, the follower will play OU T irrespective of the signal that he observes. That is, if the leader deviates and does not invest, his payo¤ will be u. Thus the supplier's price must equal v u, rather than v 0. As long as u 6 = 0; the supplier's payo¤s must di¤er when we compare pure strategy equilibria in the game with perfect observation and the game with imperfect observation.
On the other hand, if the leader randomizes then p must equal c, as we have already demonstrated. Thus we have a failure of accessibility, even when the leader has no incentive to deviate -all that is required generically is that the follower's best response varies with the leader's action.
6 6 This argument requires that the e¢ cient supplier has su¢ cient monopoly power over the action I; with any alternative supplier having a cost that is greater than minfv; v ug:
In the case where v c < u; we only required that the e¢ cient supplier has some monopoly power -an alternative supplier could have any cost strictly greater than c:
We now show that the insights contained in these two examples are quite general and apply to a large class of games played in a contracting environment, with arbitrarily many leaders and followers.
Perfect Observation
We …rst consider a leader-follower game played in a contracting environment, with perfect observation. This follows the set up in Bhaskar (2005) , although the exposition here is self-contained. We will use the term player for someone who plays the game in question, and the term supplier to denote someone with whom a player may need to contract with in order to be able to adopt some action in the game. The set of players, I; is partitioned into the set of leaders, L = f1; 2; :::; mg and the set of followers, F = fm + 1; :::; ng: Each player i has a …nite action set A i ; whose generic element will also be denoted by a j i or a i . Let A = i2I A i be the set of action pro…les, and let g i : A ! R be the gross payo¤ of player i. We extend, in the usual way, the gross payo¤ function g i to correlated action pro…les: g i ( ) is the payo¤ to player i when 2 (A) is the vector of correlated actions played.
Gross payo¤s will in general di¤er from the net payo¤s of a player since she may have to contract with a supplier in order to be able to play the action. If player i pays a price p(a j i ) in order to take action a j i ; while her opponents play a i ; her net payo¤ is given by
A player seeks to maximize her net payo¤. In order to simplify exposition, we shall assume that only leaders need contract with a supplier -followers need not do so, and their net payo¤s equal gross payo¤s. We refer the reader to Bhaskar (2008a) , which shows that all the results also apply when followers also need to contract with their suppliers.
We now turn to the market structure on the supplier side. Let A i A i be the set of actions for which leader i needs a supplier. First, we assume that there are no complementary inputs, so that for any player i and any action a j i ; no more than one supplier is required in order to take this action. For action a Let us normalize prices and gross payo¤s by measuring them net of the cost of supply of the e¢ cient supplier (equal to c ij1 for action a j i ), so that a zero price corresponds to pricing at minimum cost. Henceforth, the gross payo¤ g i (a i ; a i ) will denote the payo¤ when the player pays the minimum cost of action a i .
denote the set of suppliers for player i. Let p ijh denote the price which is charged by supplier h (a
The leader-follower game with private contracts, C ; is as follows:
1. Each supplier in L = [ i2L i quotes a price for the action that he supplies.
2. Each leader i 2 L observes the price vector p i (but not the prices quoted to other players), and chooses an action, and a supplier for the action.
3. Each follower i 2 F observes a L and followers simultaneously choose actions.
We make the following assumptions regarding the game C .
Assumption A1. For every player i there exists an action a 0 i such that no input is required to play this action.
Assumption A2. Each supplier supplies a single action of a single player.
Since we have a continuum extensive form game, where agents have in…nite strategy sets, we will be explicit in our de…nition of equilibrium. We focus on Nash equilibria that satisfy sequential rationality. Sequential rationality implies two conditions. First, at any leader action pro…le a L ; the followers choose actions optimally. Second, at any pro…le of supplier prices, p i ; leader i chooses his action optimally. This requires that we specify the leader's beliefs at out of equilibrium prices. The only beliefs that are directly payo¤ relevant for leader i are beliefs regarding the action pro…le played by the other leaders. We assume that a leader's beliefs are invariant, i.e. they are the same as his equilibrium beliefs, at any price vector p i . This restriction follows naturally from assumption A2 (no supplier supplies more than one leader), from the assumption that only leader i observes this deviation by his supplier, and from the fact that di¤erent suppliers choose their prices independently. Hence, if i's supplier deviates, i continues to believe that j's suppliers have chosen their equilibrium prices, and does not change his beliefs regarding j's actions. In addition, we rule out equilibria where an inactive supplier (i.e. one who does not make a sale) chooses a price below his cost.
Such equilibria are called cautious, and can be ruled out by considerations of trembling hand perfection. 7 We shall call our solution concept perfect Bayesian equilibrium, or equilibrium for short.
A pure strategy for a supplier h (a j i ) is a price p ijh 2 R + . A mixed 7 If we discretize the price space, and focus on sequential equilibria, a player's beliefs would be invariant at all price pro…les. To justify caution, we may restrict attention to equilibria of the continuum game which are limit points of a sequence of trembling hand equilibria of discrete games, as the grid of prices becomes …ner. Equilibria with negative prices will not be a limit of such trembling hand perfect equilibria.
strategy is a probability measure ijh on R + . A strategy for leader i is a map
A strategy pro…le is a collection (( ijh )
In usual terminology, the outcome of a strategy pro…le is the induced distribution over the terminal nodes of the game tree. In price setting games, the set of equilibrium outcomes usually contains considerable redundancy.
For example, in the case of Bertrand competition between three …rms with di¤ering unit costs, the price set by the highest cost …rm is irrelevant, and can therefore be chosen arbitrarily. It will therefore be more useful to focus on outcomes more coarsely de…ned. The action outcome associated with a strategy pro…le is the induced distribution over the set of player-action pro…les, A. The supplier payo¤s associated with is the vector of payo¤s to the suppliers under this pro…le. For the purposes of this paper, the outcome of a strategy pro…le is de…ned as the pair consisting of the action outcome and the supplier payo¤s, and is an element of Euclidean space. Failure of accessibility in terms of our de…nition of outcome will also entail failure in terms of a more re…ned de…nition, such as the distribution over terminal nodes.
Our results will relate the equilibrium action outcomes in C (the game in a contracting environment) to those in the leader-follower game ; where supplier prices are exogenously …xed at zero and players'net payo¤s equal their gross payo¤s. A strategy for a leader in is a mixed action i 2 (A i );
while a follower's strategy is a map j : A L ! (A j ). Let E denote the set of subgame perfect equilibria of . The outcome of a strategy pro…le
denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game . Let
8 To economize on notation, we do not specify explicitly a player's choice of supplier in her strategy, assuming that she always chooses the lowest price for any action.
we use the notation ana 0 i to denote the vector that results when the i-th
If the leader plays a mixed action, i ( L ; ) = 0:
The marginal contribution of an active supplier 1 (a j i ) at the pro…le (a L ; ) equals minf i (a L ; ); c ij2 g. This is the gross payo¤ loss that player i su¤ers from not choosing this supplier and choosing the next best alternative, which could be either purchasing from the ine¢ cient supplier or choosing a di¤erent action. Corollary 2 Any one-leader one-follower game C with generic payo¤s has a unique equilibrium outcome. If a supplier is required for the leader to take his equilibrium action, this supplier makes strictly positive pro…ts.
The Noisy Leader-Follower Game
We now assume that leaders'actions are observed with some noise: given that leader i chooses a The gross payo¤s to players depend only on action pro…le realized, and not upon the signal. As before, net payo¤s to leaders are equal to gross payo¤s minus the prices paid.
Note that all agents have exactly the same strategy sets in the games C and C ( ) -only the payo¤s associated with strategy pro…les di¤er in the two games. We restrict attention to cautious perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game C ( ). Fix an equilibrium of the game C ( ). The action outcome of the equilibrium is the element of (A) induced by the equilibrium.
The outcome of the equilibrium is the pair consisting of the action outcome and the pro…le of supplier payo¤s. Let ( ) denote the set of equilibrium outcomes of C ( ); and let (0) denote the set of equilibrium outcomes of C .
Expected supplier payo¤s are real numbers, while the player action outcomes are probability distributions over a …nite set. Thus ( ) R
subset of Euclidean space, and we may use the usual norm in order to de…ne convergence. We say that a sequence ! n ! ! if this convergence is in the usual topology.
Note that this is a weak de…nition of accessibility, since it only requires the existence of some sequence converging to 0 : Since our main result shows the failure of accessibility, it would also hold under a stronger de…nition.
The main result
Consider a subgame perfect equilibrium (a L ; ) of the base game ; where a L 2 A L is a pure action pro…le, and denotes the pro…le of the followers' equilibrium strategies. Denote the outcome of this equilibrium by (a L ; F );
where F = (a L ); the followers'equilibrium response to a L :
A leader has an incentive to deviate at a subgame perfect equilibrium if he can increase his payo¤, given the choices of other leaders and given that followers do not respond to this deviation. In standard leader-follower games, the question of commitment is only relevant if the leader has an incentive to deviate.
. If (a L nâ i ) di¤ers from F ; then leader i's action will be relevant (for the followers) at (a L ; ), provided that payo¤s are generic. In other words, any game where some follower's best response depends upon whether leader i chooses his commitment action a i or deviates (optimally) from this, leader i's action will be relevant. Clearly, in any game where a leader has an incentive to deviate, his action will be relevant, but the converse is not true. In the entry deterrence example, the leader has an incentive to deviate if v c > u; however, generically (i.e. as long as u 6 = 0); the leader's action is always relevant, since the follower's best responses to I and N di¤er.
Theorem 6 Let (a L ; ) be a subgame perfect equilibrium of the base leaderfollower game where the subgame following a L has a unique equilibrium F . Let C be the associated game in a contracting environment, and let ! denote the equilibrium outcome of C with action outcome (a L ; F ). Suppose that there exists a leader i 2 L such that either a) i has an incentive to deviate at (a L ; F ) and needs to contract with a supplier to take action a i ; or b) i's action is relevant at (a L ; ) and there is a monopoly supplier for action a i . Then the outcome ! is not accessible.
Approximating action pro…les
We now show that it is possible to approximate equilibrium action pro…les taken by the players in the game, even if one cannot approximate suppliers' payo¤s. Let us consider games with one leader, player 1, and one follower, player 2. We assume that the gross payo¤s in the game satisfy the following genericity assumption:
A3: For any a; a 0 2 A; a 6 = a 0 ; g 1 (a) 6 = g 1 (a 0 ) and g 2 (a) 6 = g 2 (a 0 ):
A3 implies that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the outcome of which we denote by a =(a 1 ; a 2 ). By theorem 1, the associated game C played in a contracting environment has a unique equilibrium action outcome fa g: The following theorem shows that this equilibrium action outcome is accessible in a strong sense, since the result holds for any sequence converging to 0 :
Theorem 7 Let be a one-leader one-follower game that satis…es A3, with subgame perfect equilibrium outcome a . For any countable sequence ! 0 ; 2 Int( ) and associated sequence of noisy games C ( ); there exists a
It might be argued that in games played in a contracting environment, imperfect observation has distributional consequences, but has no implications for the actions that are taken. In our view this is not an appropriate interpretation: the payo¤s to suppliers will have incentive e¤ects and will therefore a¤ect outcomes in a broader sense. For example, if supplier entry decisions were included in the analysis, these would be in ‡uenced by the profits they make. More generally, if one studies economic environments which combine pricing and commitment, outcomes may be very sensitive to the monitoring structure. Bhaskar (2008b) studies a model of dynamic price competition and …nds that economic outcomes are very di¤erent when one compares perfect monitoring with monitoring that is slightly imperfect.
Extensions and robustness
We now turn to some extensions and examine the robustness of our results.
In order to simplify exposition, we shall focus throughout this section on extensions and variations on our entry deterrence example.
Costly observation
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Our results on the failure of accessibility also extend to the case where observation is costly, as in Várdy (2004) . Várdy considers a model with one leader and one follower, where the follower must choose whether or not to observe 9 I am indebted to a referee for suggesting this extension. the leader's action. Observation entails a small cost, but is perfect. Várdy shows that the Stackelberg action pro…le of the game where the follower automatically and costlessly observes the leader's action can be approximated by an equilibrium distribution over action pro…les of the game with costly observation when the observation cost is small.
Let us now consider the implications of costly observation in the context of our entry deterrence game, where we assume v c < u, so that the leader has an incentive to deviate. There cannot be an equilibrium where the leader invests with probability one, since then it is not optimal for the follower to pay the observation cost. So the commitment equilibrium must be in mixed strategies, where the leader invests with probability less than one, and where the follower randomizes between observing and not observing. Indeed, one can construct an equilibrium, where the probability of the outcome (I;OUT)
(the leader investing and the follower staying out) converges to one as the observation cost tends to zero. This result can be generalized to arbitrary one-leader one-follower games with generic payo¤s played in a contracting environment. Speci…cally, the equilibrium outcome when the follower costlessly observes the leader's action cannot be approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with costly ob-servation, as the cost tends to zero. This result obtains under precisely the same conditions as our main theorem (6) . Accessibility fails if the leader has an incentive to deviate at the equilibrium action pro…le and he needs to contract with a supplier to take this action. It also fails if his action is relevant for the follower (as in de…nition 5) and there is a monopoly supplier for this action. We refer the reader to Bhaskar (2008a) for a precise statement and proof of this result.
This result is related to Morgan and Várdy (2007) , who analyze a leaderfollower game with continuum action sets and strictly concave payo¤ functions. They show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome cannot be approximated in the game with costly observation. This arises since the leader's payo¤ function is strictly concave and has a unique maximizer, so that randomization becomes impossible. Thus their conclusions are similar to ours, but they follow from considerations that are quite distinct.
Robustness
We now consider the role of our assumptions in explaining the failure of accessibility. These include the fact that prices can be chosen from an in…nite set, that supplier prices are private, and that there is complete information about payo¤s.
A key assumption is that contracting is private. In the context of the entry deterrence example, this implies that the price quoted by the supplier to the incumbent is not observed by the entrant. If contracting is public so that the price p is also observed by the entrant, the probability of entry can be conditioned upon p; so as to make the incumbent indi¤erent for any value of p. This removes the supplier's incentive to undercut, and one may construct equilibria that restore accessibility in this example. Public contracting throws up other interesting possibilities when there is competition between rival suppliers in a mixed strategy equilibrium, and we refer the interested reader to Bhaskar (2005) for an analysis of games with public contracting.
In our view, private contracting is a more reasonable assumption than public contracting, since the latter is only viable if the supplier is unable to o¤er secret price discounts.
Discrete prices
Games played in a contracting environment are clearly not generic extensive form games, in the sense of Güth et al. (1998) . First, the game is not …nite, since prices are chosen from a continuum. Second, payo¤s are assumed to be quasi-linear, and so even in a discretized version of the game, the set of feasible payo¤s does not have full dimension. Let us discuss these issues in the context of the entry deterrence example, where we assume v c < u:
Quasi-linearity is not really critical, since one can relax this assumption. Our argument only requires that the leader's payo¤ is strictly decreasing in the price that he pays, so that a small reduction in the price su¢ ces to break his indi¤erence. To explore the role of the continuum assumption, let us now consider a discrete price grid. The supplier must choose a price p i from the
where m 2 N indexes the …neness of the price grid.
The noisy game C can now be parameterized by the pair ("; m) where " is the noise in observation. It will be convenient to assume that the payo¤ v in Fig. 1 is an irrational number. Let p (m) be the largest price that is less than v, and let the grid be su¢ ciently …ne so that p (m) > c. With perfect observation, the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome has the supplier choosing p (m); the incumbent investing at this price, and the entrant staying out, so that supplier pro…ts equal p (m) c. Now let us consider the situation where commitment is imperfectly observed. Fix an equilibrium of the game C ("; m), where I is played by the incumbent with positive probability, and letp(m) be the largest price that is chosen by the supplier in this equilibrium. Clearly, atp(m) the incumbent must buy with positive probability, since otherwisep will not be chosen by the supplier. Since it is optimal for the incumbent to buy atp; it must be strictly optimal to buy at any price strictly belowp. Hence the supplier can ensure the payo¤ ofp(m) . If is the probability that the incumbent invests at pricep; we must have that
On the other hand, the probability of investment must equal = 1 2" 1 " so as to provide incentives for the entrant, implying that
This gives us the condition:p
The right hand side of the inequality (7) provides an upper bound on the price that can be charged by the supplier. This bound is independent of v and tends to zero for …xed " as m tends to in…nity. The bound is relevant provided that it is smaller than p (m). It is easy to verify that:
1. For any " > 0; there exists m (") such that if we consider the sequence ("; m(")) where " ! 0 and m(") m ("); the Stackelberg outcome is not accessible.
2. If we …x m; and consider the sequence C ("; m) where " ! 0; the Stackelberg outcome is accessible.
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As an example, let c = 0; and v = $100 + ; where is a tiny irrational number. The supplier makes a pro…t of $100 when commitment is perfectly observed. In the game with noisy observation, suppose that the probability that the incumbent does not invest must equal " in order to make the entrant indi¤erent between entering and staying out when she observes n. If the price grid is in cents, then the supplier will have no incentive to reduce price below $100 only if (1 ")100 99:99; i.e. " must be smaller than 0:0001. In other words, if the pro…ts that the supplier makes are large relative to the minimum unit of account, the noise must be very small indeed.
Incomplete information and puri…cation
One comment, which has often been made, is that a small amount of incomplete information regarding payo¤s will smooth away the discontinuities associated with Bertrand pricing, and restore accessibility. This intuition is not valid; if the uncertainty about payo¤s is small relative to the noise in observation, the failure of accessibility persists. To consider this question most simply, let us modify the payo¤s of the incumbent in the entry deterrence game of Fig. 1 by augmenting the payo¤ to action I by z; where is a small positive number, and z is the realization of a random variable which is distributed with density f on support [0; 1]. Assume f (:) > m > 0 on its support, 12 and that only the incumbent observes the realization of z, so that we have a private payo¤ shock as in Harsanyi (1973) .
Consider …rst the game where the entrant perfectly observes the incumbent's choice of action. Given a price p; the incumbent's payo¤ from investing is given by v + z p. The marginal type of incumbent, who is indi¤erent between investing and not, is given by z = p v . Thus the payo¤ of the supplier from a price p equals 12 The lower bound on f (:) is not essential for our argument, but simpli…es its exposition.
(p) = (p c):
The derivative of pro…ts with respect to p equals
which is strictly negative if is su¢ ciently small, as long as the incumbent invests with probability less than one. Therefore the supplier must choose price equal to v; so that the incumbent invests with probability one.
Let us now suppose that commitment is imperfectly observed. Consider an equilibrium where the supplier chooses a price p ; and the incumbent chooses to invest for some realizations of his private information, and chooses not to invest for other realizations. The entrant stays out when he observes the signal i; and enters with probability on observing the signal n. Since the entrant's payo¤s are not perturbed, the probability that the incumbent invests must equal . Letting z(p) denote the payo¤ realization of the type of incumbent who is indi¤erent between the two actions at an arbitrary price p, the indi¤erence condition for z(p) is
Supplier pro…ts, as a function of p; are given by
The derivative of pro…ts is given by
which is strictly negative for su¢ ciently small, at any interior value of z. Since z must be interior if the incumbent does not invest with positive probability, the equilibrium price p cannot be strictly greater than c if is su¢ ciently small. That is, for a given value of "; supplier payo¤s must converge to zero as ! 0; and small payo¤ uncertainty, in the manner of Harsanyi, does not restore accessibility. Note however that if payo¤ uncertainty is large relative to " (as in Maggi, 1999) , then the leader will take his non-commitment action with su¢ ciently high probability, so that the follower's beliefs will be sensitive to the signal. 13 
Concluding comments
We have demonstrated that in leader-follower games played in a contracting environment, subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are not accessible under fairly general conditions, when suppliers have some monopoly power.
The basic intuition is as follows. Under perfect observation, the monopoly power of suppliers ensures that they make positive pro…ts at the commitment equilibrium. When there is imperfect observation, a leader may have an incentive to deviate from his commitment action. To provide incentives for the followers to respond appropriately to this deviation, the leader needs to randomize, and must choose his commitment action with probability less than one. However, if a leader randomizes, then his supplier must also be indi¤erent between his actions, since otherwise the supplier would have an incentive to reduce his price slightly to ensure that the leader takes the commitment action for sure. Thus the supplier cannot make positive pro…ts in any such mixed equilibrium, ensuring a failure of accessibility.
The present paper has set out a very speci…c class of games -leaderfollower games played in a contracting environment -in order to make this 13 Similar arguments apply when there is private information about the costs of the supplier, c. Large uncertainty about supplier costs will allow accessibility, while small uncertainty implies a failure of accessibility of supplier payo¤s. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Let be a probability distribution on A L ; the set of leader action pro…les.
Let G( ) be the normal form game between the followers in stage 2 where it is common knowledge that the leaders' actions are chosen according to ; and let G C ( ) denote the second stage of the (noisy or noiseless) game C ; when it is common knowledge among the followers that the distribution over leader action pro…les is . It is immediate that there is an equivalence between the equilibria of G( ) and G C ( ) -although the prices chosen by the suppliers in stage 1 are not observed by the followers, these prices are payo¤ irrelevant. With a slight abuse of notation, let G(a L ) denote the game where assigns probability one to a L and let E(a L ) denote the set of Nash equilibria of G(a L ):
We now proceed to the …rst stage of the game C ; the leader-follower game in a contracting environment. Given any action pro…le a L chosen by the leaders, gross payo¤s to any leader i are given by
where
Thus any equilibrium strategy pro…le of the followers de…nes a strategic form game for the leaders played in a contracting environment. 
Proof of Theorem 6:
By theorem 1, the game C has an equilibrium with action outcome (a L ; F ); where the price charged by supplier 1 (a i );
this supplier is a monopolist, and strictly positive otherwise. Let ! denote the outcome of this equilibrium.
Since G(a L ) has a unique equilibrium, F ; G( ) also has a unique equilibrium that is close to F provided that is close to a L (i.e. assigns probability close to one to a L ). This follows from the fact that the Nash equilibrium correspondence has a closed graph, and the uniqueness of equilibrium in G(a L ). If the weak inequalities required for Nash equilibrium are violated for any other pro…le 0 in G(a L ); they will also be violated at We consider …rst the case where leader i plays a i for sure in ( ). Let a L na i denote the signal pro…le which di¤ers from a L only in the i'th component, with a i replacing a i . (a L na i ) = (a L ) since nature chooses the components of the signal pro…le independently, and since the followers believe that i has chosen a i irrespective of the signal that is observed. Since equilibrium is unique at belief (a L ); the followers must play~ F (a L ) also at the signal a L na i . If condition (i) holds, leader i has an incentive to deviate at the pro…le (a L ; F ); and will also have an incentive to deviate from a i in ( ) when " is su¢ ciently small, since the follower's behavior does not depend upon his action a i when the signal pro…le a L na i is realized. If condition (ii) holds, then in the noiseless game, supplier 1 (a i ) must earn i (a L ; ). Let i (a L ; F ) = g i (a L ; F ) max a i 6 =a i g i (a L na i ; F ) denote the deviation loss of the leader in the simultaneous move game, where the follower has no observation of the leader's action. If leader i 0 s action is relevant, i (a L ; F ) 6 = i (a L ; ). So if i (a L ; F ) < i (a L ; ) and p 1 (a i ) > i (a L ; F ) and " is suf…ciently close to zero, it is optimal for the leader to deviate and choose the action a 1 2 arg max a 1 6 =a 1 g 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ) since the followers must play~ F (a L ) after every signal (a L na i ). Hence the payo¤ of supplier 1 (a i ) cannot be close to i (a L ; ). Conversely, if i (a L ; F ) > i (a L ; ), 1 (a i ) can increase his price and it will still be optimal for the leader to buy. Thus we cannot have an equilibrium where a i is played with probability one and where supplier's price p 1 (a i ) is close to i (a L ; ):
Finally, we consider the case where either leader i or supplier 1 (a i ) randomize. If leader i randomizes, p 1 (a i ) = 0; since otherwise the supplier can reduce his price slightly and ensure that the leader plays a i for sure. If the supplier randomizes across two prices and makes positive pro…ts, then the lower price cannot be optimal, since the leader must play a i for sure at an intermediate price. Since supplier pro…ts must equal zero at any equilibrium with randomization, the outcome cannot be close to ! :
Proof of Theorem 7: We consider two separate cases, depending upon whether the leader has an incentive to deviate or not. Suppose that the leader has no incentive to deviate, so that a 1 2 arg max a 1 g 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ). In the noisy game, let supplier 1 (a 1 ) price at minf 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ); c 12 g ( if no supplier is needed for a 1 ; set this price equal to zero), and let suppliers for other actions choose a price of zero. Let the leader choose a 1 ; and let the follower choose the continuation strategy in C (the noiseless game) that follows the play of a 1 ; regardless of the signal that is observed. This is clearly optimal given that a 1 is played with probability one by the leader, since 2 Int( ).
Given the follower's behavior, it is optimal for the leader to play a 1 ; since max a 1 6 =a 1 g 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ) = g 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ) 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ) g 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ) p 1 (a 1 ). Thus a is an equilibrium action outcome of the noisy game.
Suppose now that the leader has an incentive to deviate at a . From van Damme and Hurkens (1997), we know that if A3 is satis…ed, there exists countable sequences ( ; ( )); where ! 0 ; 2 Int( ) , such that in each ( ); there exists an equilibrium ( 1 ( ); 2 ( )); where the outcomes of this sequence of equilibria converge to a . For any in this sequence, we shall construct an equilibrium ( ) in C ( ); the noisy game played in a contracting environment, with the property that ( ) induces the same behavior by the players as ( 1 ( ); 2 ( )). Consider C ( ) and for any signal a 1 , let the follower's strategy 2 (a 1 ; ) be such that 2 (a 1 ; ) = 2 (a 1 ; ).
Since 1 ( ) is optimal for the leader in ( ); it is also optimal for the leader to play 1 ( ) in C ( ) since the payo¤s are the same in the two games.
Furthermore, given that the leader has an incentive to deviate at a ; 1 ( ) does not assign probability one to a 1 ; i.e. the leader is randomizing between two or more actions. Thus it is optimal for every seller to choose a price of zero, since any active seller who increases his price will fail to sell with probability one.
Finally, if 2 (a 1 ; ) is optimal for the follower in the game ( ); then 2 (a 1 ; ) is optimal in C ( ) since the payo¤ function of the follower is identical in the two games.
